Now we are prepared to consider the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the acts of Congress before mentioned. This preliminary discussion was necessary in order that it may be clearly seen how completely this whole history has been ignored, how entirely every one of these principles have been subverted, and how certainly these precepts of the supreme law have been overridden, in the Supreme Court decision of February 29, 1892, and in the acts of Congress closing the World’s Fair on Sunday. UCS 17.3
The said decision, which we notice first, was called out in this way: In 1887 Congress enacted a law forbidding any aliens to come to this country under contract to perform labor or service of any kind. The reason of that law was that large contractors in the United States, and corporations who wanted to increase their wealth with as little expense as possible, would send agents to Europe to come over and work. They would pay their expenses over, and allow them to work it out at very small wages after they got over here. This was depreciating the price that Americans should receive for their labor, and therefore Congress enacted a law as follows:— UCS 17.4
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its Territories, or special, expressed or implied, made previous to the importation or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia.” UCS 18.1
Trinity corporation in New York City hired a preacher in England to come over here and preach for them. They contracted with him before he came. He was an alien, and came over under contract, to perform service for that church. The United States District Attorney entered suit against the church for violating this law. The United States Circuit Court decided that the church was guilty, and rendered judgment accordingly. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, upon writ of error. UCS 18.2
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, first upon a well-established principle that “the intent of the lawmaker is the law.” The court quoted directly from the reports of the Senate Committee and the House Committee who had the bill in charge when it was put through Congress; and these both said in express terms that the term “laborer,“ or “labor or service,” used in the statute, was intended to mean only manual labor or service, and not professional service of any kind. Therefore, that being the intent, and the only intent of the law, and the intent of the lawmaker being the law, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, and said that the act complained of was not a violation of the law. UCS 18.3
So far as this goes, the decision is perfectly proper; and it needed to have gone no further, as the only point in the case was here fully decided. UCS 19.1
But between this paragraph and the closing paragraph of the decision, there is brought in and made an essential part of the decision, a mass of matter not only totally irrelevant to the case, but wholly beyond the rightful jurisdiction or the proper cognizance of the court. A mere glance at the document is sufficient for anyone to see that this part of the decision is entirely out of place; while a study of the document can only create astonishment as to how in the world that part of it ever could have got there, and the more it is studied the more the astonishment will be increased. 1Among the legal fraternity there is a disposition to pass this part of the decision by, as mere ubiter dicta, having no real force or effect in law. But there is not a particle of evidence to show that it is such or that the court intended it as such. It is said, however, that it must be so “because it is unnecessary and irrelevant.” But the court has considered it both necessary and relevant, and has given no hint or token to the contrary. It is a second clearly-defined line of reasoning (?) which the court has followed and has used, by which, with the former, it reversed the decision of the court below. And, so far as the document itself goes, it is just as much a part of the real intentional decision of the court as is the first line of reasoning which is followed. Besides this the statements are too positive and too sweeping for mere obiter dicta. Yet even though it were dicta, and were stated to be such, its evil effect would not be destroyed; for in the State of Tennessee to-day that which was plainly set forth by the United States Circuit Court as dicta only, is being used, and has been used, as authority under which to carry on a systematic course of religions persecution. (See the decision in full at the end of this pamphlet.) UCS 19.2
In this part of the decision the court cites “historical” evidence by which it establishes the Christian religion as the national religion; justifies the use of the civil power to maintain the discipline of the churches; a religious test oath as a qualification for office; general taxation for the support of “public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality;” the governmental requirement of a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity and the inspiration of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments; and then without a break quotes the Constitution of the United States, in which religious legislation and religious establishments are positively prohibited, and flatly declares:— UCS 20.1
“There is no dissonance in these declarations.(!!) There is a universal language pervading them all, having one meaning.(!!) They affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation.” UCS 20.2
Now as we call up in succession these “historical” evidences, and it is seen what they say and what they mean, let it be borne in mind that, according to the view of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Constitution of the United States means the same thing. UCS 20.3
After reviewing the act of Congress in question, the reports of committees, etc., and deciding that the law has no such intent as the lower court gave it, the Supreme Court introduces this part of the decision in these words:— UCS 20.4
“But beyond all these matters, no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation, State or national, because this is a religious people. This is historically true. From the discovery of this continent to the present hour, there is a single voice making this affirmation.” UCS 20.5
Every citizen of the United States knows that it is not true, either historically or otherwise, that this is a religious people. Not even a majority of the people are religious. There is not a single city in the United States in which the people are religious—no, not a single town or village. UCS 20.6
That is to say, this was so up to the time of the rendering of this decision, February 29, 1892; since that, of course the people are religious because the Supreme Court says so. To be sure, some of our neighbors, and many other people whom we meet, do not know that they are religious people, as they have never chosen to be so and do not profess it at all; but all that makes no difference; the Supreme Court of the United States has by unanimous decision declared that they are religious people, and it must be so whether they know it or not. Nor is this all. The court not only declares that this is a “religious nation,” but that it is a “Christian nation.” The people, therefore, are not only religious but they are Christian—yes, Jews, infidels and all. For is not the Supreme Court the highest judicial authority in the United States? and what this court declares to be the law, isn’t that the law? and when this court lays it down as the supreme law that people are religious, and are Christians, then doesn’t that settle the question?—Not much. The very absurdity of the suggestion only demonstrates that the court can have nothing at all to do with any such matters, and shows how completely the court has transcended its powers and gone out of the right way. No; men are not made religious by law, nor by judicial decision, nor by historical precedents. UCS 21.1
The statement that “from the discovery of this continent to the present hour there is a single voice” making the affirmation that this nation is a religious people, is equally wide of the mark. For at the time of the making of this national government there was a new fresh voice heard contradicting the long, dismal monotone of the ages, and declaring for this new nation that it “is not in any sense founded upon the Christian religion,” and that it can never of right have anything to do with religion. And this voice it was which gave rise to the “new order of things” for this country and for the world. Has the court never heard this voice? UCS 21.2
After this deliverance the court proceeds to cite historical evidences to prove the proposition that this is a “religious people” and a “Christian nation.” The first is as follows:— UCS 22.1
“The commission to Christopher Columbus, prior to his sail westward, is from ‘Ferdinand and Isabella, by the grace of God, king and queen of Castile,’ etc., and recites that ‘it is hoped by God’s assistance some of the continents and islands in the ocean will be discovered,’ etc.” UCS 22.2
What religion did Ferdinand and Isabella have in mind when they issued that document? What religion did they profess? And what religion did they possess, too? The Catholic religion, to be sure. And not only that, it was the Catholic religion with the Inquisition in full swing. For it was Ferdinand and Isabella who established the Inquisition in Spain under the generalship of Torquemada, and who, because Spain was a “Christian nation,” sentenced to confiscation of all goods and to banishment every Jew who would not turn Catholic. And by virtue of such religious activity as this, Ferdinand and Isabella fairly earned as an everlasting reward, and by way of preëminence, the title of “THE CATHOLICS.” And this is the first piece of “historical” authority by which the Supreme Court of the United States adjudges American citizens “to be a religious people,” and by which that court decides that this is a “Christian nation. UCS 22.3
Now that is quoted to prove that this is a “religious people” and a “Christian nation;” and it is declared that the language of Ferdinand and Isabella, and the language of the Constitution of the United States, “have one meaning.” UCS 23.1
Then in view of that quotation and this decision, should it be wondered at if the Catholic Church should claim that this is so indeed, and should demand favors from the government as such? Everybody knows that the Catholic Church already is not slow to take part in political questions, to interfere with the government, and to have the government recognize the Catholic Church and give it every year from the public treasury nearly four hundred thousand dollars of the money of all the people. The people know that this is already the case. And now, when the Catholic religion is virtually recognized by official action of the Supreme Court; and when that court declares that this is what the Constitution means, should it be thought strange if the Catholic Church should claim that that is correct, and act upon it? UCS 23.2
It is true, the court does not stick to this side of the question all the way through, but turns over to the Church of England, and to Puritan Protestantism. But this intensifies rather than modifies the danger, as it opens the way for a strife among these religions, to see which shall be indeed the religion of the nation. UCS 23.3
As the intentions of Ferdinand and Isabella did not reach the part of the continent now occupied by the government of the United States, the court next proceeds to introduce documents by which it would give to Protestantism the prior right here, and which do in fact make this the national religion; so we quote:— UCS 23.4
“The best colonial grant, that made to Sir Walter Raliegh in 1584, was from ‘Elizabeth, by the grace of God; of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, queene, Defender of the Faith,’ etc.; and the grant authorized him to enact statutes for the government of the proposed colony; Provided, That ‘they be not against Mary a powerful effort was made to bring all back into full the true Christian faith now professed in the Church of England.’ ... Language of a similar import may be found in the subsequent charters, ... and the same is true of the various charters granted to other colonies. In language more or less emphatic, is the establishment of the Christian religion declared to be one of the purposes of the grant.” UCS 23.5
This establishes as the religion of this nation and people the religion “professed in the Church of England” in Queen Elizabeth’s time. 2“It may very properly be noted here, in passing, that this and the previous quotation just as certainly prove the divine right of rulers in this country, as they prove that this is “a religious people” or a “Christian nation.” What religion was this? The queen’s title of “Defender of the Faith” will help us to understand this. That title was obtained in this way: Henry VIII., Elizabeth;s father, wrote a book against Martin Luther and the Reformation. He sent a copy of this book to the pope. In return, the pope bestowed upon him the title and dignity of “Defender of the Faith.” And this was the Catholic faith. Shortly afterward Henry wanted a divorce from his wife. The pope could not make his political ends meet so as to grant the divorce; and Henry took the matter into his own and Cranmer’s hands, and divorced both his wife and the pope. This separated the church in England from the Catholic Church. Then that which had formerly been the Catholic Church in England, became the Church of England, the only difference being that Henry was head of the church instead of the pope. Thus Henry still maintained his title of “Defender of the Faith,” and it was the same faith—except only as to the head of it. UCS 24.1
Under Edward VI. a few very slight steps were taken further away from the absolute Catholic faith. Under Mary a powerful effort was made to bring all back into full harmony with the papal religion. Mary soon died, and Elizabeth succeeded, and would have been glad to complete Mary’s scheme, but, as she was more of a politician than she was a Catholic, she submitted to be content with things as they were left by Edward, for the nation and people, while, in her own private individual life, she inclined strongly to the papal religion outright. So the sum of the matter is that the religion professed in the Church of England in Queen Elizabeth’s time was a religion which was just as near to the Roman Catholic religion as was possible without being precisely that religion. UCS 25.1
And this is the religion which the Supreme Court of the United States finds to be historically intended to be established here, and which by this decision the court declares now to be established here, according to the meaning of the Constitution of the United States; because the language of the Constitution and the language of all these other documents is one language, “having one meaning.” UCS 25.2
It is to be expected also that the religion established should be as much like the papal religion as possible, without being precisely that religion itself, as the prophecy says that it would be said that they should make an image to the beast—the Papacy. Revelation 13:14. UCS 25.3
It is true that “the establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes” of all these grants. But are the American people still bound by the purposes and intentions of Queen Elizabeth and her British successors? Does Britain still rule America, that the intents and pur- poses of British sovereigns shall be held binding upon the American people? Is it possible that the Supreme Court of the United States knows nothing of the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence, by which it was both declared and demonstrated that these Colonies are and of right ought to be free and independent States—free and independent of British rule, and of the intents and purposes of British sovereigns in all things, religious as well as civil? UCS 25.4
It is true that “the establishment of the Christian religion was one of the purposes” of these grants. But shall the Constitution of the United States count for nothing, when it positively prohibits any religious test, and any establishment of religion of any kind? Shall the supreme law of this nation count for nothing in its solemn declaration that “the Government of the United States is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion”? Has the Supreme Court of the United States the right to supplant the supreme law of this land with the intents and purposes of the sovereigns of England? Is the Supreme Court of the United States the interpreter of the supreme law of the United States? or is it the interpreter of the intents and purposes of the sovereigns of England, France, and Ireland, “Defenders of the Faith”? Are the people of the United States the subjects of Great Britain? or are they free American citizens? UCS 26.1
Yet the court does not propose to be partial, nor presume to establish strictly this particular phase of religion without giving any other any chance for recognition. It proceeds next to introduce Puritanism, as follows:— UCS 26.2
“The celebrated compact made by the Pilgrims in the Mayflower, 1920, recites:— UCS 26.3
“Having undertaken for the glory of God and Advancement of the Christian faith, and the honor of our King and Country, a Voyage to plant the first colony in the northern part of Virginia; Do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid.” UCS 27.1
Having thus established what it chooses to declare to be “the Christian faith” as the religion of this nation, the court next proceeds to cite historical evidence that it is legitimate to use the civil power to maintain “the discipline of the churches.” This is done by citing the compact of the Puritans who settled Connecticut, as follows:— UCS 27.2
“Forasmuch as it hath pleased the Allmighty God by the wise disposition of his diuyne pruidence so to Order and dispose of things that we the Inhabitants and Residents of Windsor, Hartford and Wethersfield are now cohabiting and dwelling in and vppon the River of Conectecotte and the Lands thereunto adioyneing; And well knowing where a people are gathered togather the word of God requires that to mayntayne the peace and vnion of such a people there should be an orderly and decent Gouerment established according to God, to order and dispose of the affayres of the people at all seasons as occation shall require; doe therefore assotiate and conioyne our selues to be as one Publike State or Commonwelth; and doe, for our selues and our Successors and such as shall be adioyned to vs att any tyme hereafter, enter into Combination and Confederation togather, to mayntayne and presearue the liberty and purity of the gospell of our Lord Jesus well we now prfesse, as also the disciplyne of the Churches, wch according to the truth of the said gospell is now practised amongst vs.” UCS 27.3
By this “historical” citation, the Supreme Court just as certainly justifies the employment of the “civil body politick” for the maintenance of “the disciplyne of the churches,” as by this and the previous ones it establishes the Christian religion as the religion of this nation. For it was just as much and as directly the intention of those people to maintain the discipline of the churches as it was to “preserve the liberty and purity of the gospel then practiced” among them. Indeed, it was only by maintaining the discipline of the churches that they expected to preserve religion as practiced thus. And all know how thoroughly this was done. And this decision declares that the language of this citation and the language of the national Constitution is “one language,” “having one meaning”! UCS 27.4
By this, therefore, the Supreme Court has decided that the civil power, even of the United States Government, can rightly be employed to maintain the discipline of the churches. And this, as we know and have shown over and over again, is exactly what the churches are aiming to bring about by the national enforcement of Sunday laws. This is precisely what is done by the enforcement of Sunday laws, either State or national. And this the United States Supreme Court fully sanctions and justifies by its decision, and its (mis)interpretation of the national Constitution. UCS 28.1
So far, therefore, in this decision we find a national religion established with the sanction of the maintenance of the discipline of the churches by the civil power. What next?—Why, the requirement of the religious oath of witnesses, and the religious test oath as a qualification for office. After citing William Penn’s grant of privileges to the province of Pennsylvania and the Declaration of Independence, in which “the Creator,” “the Supreme Judge of the world,” and “Divine Providence,” is referred to; and the Constitution of Illinois, in which God is recognized, the court quotes from the Constitution of Maryland, establishing the legality of the religious oath and the religious test oath as follows:— UCS 28.2
“That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most acceptable to him, all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace, or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil, or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any place of worship, or any ministry; nor shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or Juror, on account of his religious belief; Provided he believes in the existence of God, and that, under his dispensation, such person will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world or the world to come.” UCS 29.1
“Provided he believe in the existence of God.” That is, in other words, no man ought to be interfered with in his profession or principles of religious belief, provided he holds these according to the dictates of the State. That has been the practice in all the history of the Catholic Church. It is the very doctrine of the Papacy. It was also the doctrine of Pagan Rome, before the Papacy supplanted it. UCS 29.2
Paganism declared that “no man shall have particular gods of his own, except they are recognized by the laws of the State.” But the court continues this quotation, providing further:— UCS 29.3
“That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this Constitution.” UCS 29.4
That is the provision and the requirement of the Constitution of Maryland. But, says the Supreme Court, that speaks the same language as the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the United States and this quotation have “one meaning.” And although the Constitution of the United States positively declares that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under this government, this decision says that it means that no other religious test shall ever be required than “belief in the existence of God,” and that he will reward or punish in this world or the world to come, for these documents “all” have “one language” and “one meaning.” UCS 30.1
So, then, we find that so far this decision establishes a national religion and justifies the maintenance of the discipline of the churches by the civil power, the requirement of the religious oath in court, and the religious test oath as a qualification for office. And what next?—Why, public taxation for the support of religion. This is justified by a quotation from the Constitution of Massachusetts, as follows:— UCS 30.2
“It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe.... As the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of civil government essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality, and as these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the institution of the public worship of God, and of public instructions in piety, religion, and morality; Therefore, to promote their happiness, and to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the people of this commonwealth have a right to invest their Legislature with power to authorize and require, and the Legislature shall [“shall,” not may] from time authorize and require the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic or religious societies to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenances of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily.” UCS 30.3
And says the court, This document and the Constitution of the United States have the same language, have “one meaning,” and both alike, with all the other quotations, “speak the voice of the entire people.” So far, then, by this decision there is established here a national religion; with this there is justified the maintenance of the discipline of the churches by the civil power; the requirement of the religious oath and the religious test oath, and public taxation for “the worship of God,” and for the “support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of religion.” The wicked thing rapidly grows as it goes. UCS 31.1
But what next?—Why, the requirement of all officers, of a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity and the inspiration of the Scriptures. This is justified by a quotation from the Constitution of Delaware of 1776, as follows:— UCS 31.2
“I, A. B., do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ his only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed forevermore; and I do acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be given by divine inspiration.” UCS 31.3
And the doctrine that is held all through the decision, that this thing and the Constitution speak the same language and have one meaning, is just at this point emphasized in the following words:— UCS 31.4
“Even the Constitution of the United States, which is sup-posed to have little touch upon the private life of the individual, contains in the First Amendment a declaration common to the Constitutions of all the States, as follows: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’ And also provides that the Executive shall have ten days (Sundays excepted) within which to determine whether he will approve or veto a bill. [And here is a sly recognition of Sunday observance as constitutional] There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading them all, having one meaning; they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These are not individual sayings, declarations of private persons; they are organic utterances; they speak the voice of the entire people.” UCS 31.5
How the court could present such a string of quotations, every one of which distinctly contemplated an establishment of religion and the prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and in every feature and every intent, absolutely prohibits any establishment of religion, and any interference with the free exercise thereof—how the court could do this thing and then declare that “there is no dissonance” in the declarations, that they all have the same language, and “one meaning,” is a most astonishing thing. If such a thing had been done by any of the common run of American citizens, it could have been considered as nothing less than wildly absurd; but coining as it does from such a source as the Supreme Court of the whole nation, it is as far worse as could be possible. To say that it is absurd is not enough, it is siimply preposterous. And yet, preposterous as it is, it is expected to, and, so far as the great mass of the people are concerned, it undoubtedly will, carry with it all the weight of national law. UCS 32.1
But the decision does not stop even here. Having established a religion for “the entire people,” and sanctioned all the appurtenances thereto, the court cites and sanctians [sic.] the declaration of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that “Christianity is, and always has been, part of the common law,” and then proceeds to establish the doctrine that it is blasphemy to speak or act in contempt “of the religion professed by almost the whole community.” And this is done by citing the pagan decision of Chief Justice Kent, of New York, which “assumes that we are a Christian people.” UCS 32.2
There remains but one thing more to complete the perfect likeness of the whole papal system and that is the direct and positive sanction of Sunday laws. Nor is this one thing lacking. It is fully and completely supplied. As before observed, it is broadly hinted at in the quotation last made above. But the court does not stop with that; it makes Sunday laws one of the “organic utterances,” which prove conclusively that “this is a Christian nation.” The words of the court are as follows:— UCS 33.1
“If we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs, and its society, the find everywhere a clear recognition of the came truth. Among other matters, note the following: The form of oath universally prevailing, concluding with an appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening sessions of all deliberative bodies, and most conventions, with prayer; the prefatory words of all wills, ‘In the name of God, Amen;’ the laws respecting the observance of the Sabbath with the general cessation of all secular business, and the closing of courts, legislatures, and other similar public assemblies on that day.... These, and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances that THIS IS A CHRISTIAN NATION.” UCS 33.2
Now let us sum this up and see what has been done: There is a national religion established, and it is called Christianity and Protestantism. With this there is also specifically declared and justified as the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, (1) the maintenance of the discipline of the churches by the civil power; (2) the requirement of the religious oath; (3) the requirement of the religious test oath as a qualification for office; (4) public taxation for the support of religion and religious teachers; (5) the requirement of a belief in the Trinity and the inspiration of “holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments;” (6) the guilt of blasphemy upon everyone who speaks or acts in contempt of the established religion; and (7) laws for the observance of Sunday, with the general cessation of all “secular business.” UCS 33.3
All this is declared by unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to be the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. This, too, to the utter oblivion of all the history of the making of that Constitution, in open contradiction of the specific terms of that Constitution, and in defiance of the clear intent of that Constitution, as declared in the supreme law by those who made it. UCS 34.1
Now what was ever the Papacy more than is this thing
which is established and justified in and by this decision?
What more was ever required by the Papacy, and all
phases of the old order of things, than is allowed and justified
in this decision? What more was ever required by the
Papacy itself than that the “Christian religion” should be
made the national religion; that the discipline of the
church should be maintained by the civil power; that the
religious test oath should be applied to all; that the public
should be taxed for the support of religion and religious
teachers; that there should be required a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity and the inspiration of the “holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments;” that the guilt of “blasphemy” should be inflicted upon everyone who should speak or act “in contempt” of the established religion; 3It will not be amiss right here to recall the fact that Martin Luther, by an official edict issued by the Emperor Charles V., was made an outlaw in all Europe, because he had “sought to destroy the holy church by means of books filled with blasphemy.” and that everybody should be required by law to observe Sunday? No more than this was ever required by the Papacy. And, in fact, no more could be required, for this covers all. And by this decision all this is justified in this government, and is declared to be the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, but in favor of Protestantism. UCS 34.2
Here we would ask two questions, and inquire whether anyone can have any difficulty in answering them: Does this decision maintain the “new order of things” to which this government and nation stand pledged by the Great Seal of the United States? or does it sanction and restore and establish here the old order of things, which our governmental fathers hoped we should forever escape? UCS 35.1
What, then, is this but the legal establishment of the very likeness of the Papacy, and that by the supreme judicial authority of the national government? What more could be done to make the likeness of the Papacy, in the principle of the thing? In principle, we say, not in its positive workings, for life is not by this given to it that it should speak and act (Revelation 13:15); but so far as the making of the evil thing, and the establishment of the principle of it, the thing is done. The tree does not yet stand with its branches widespread bearing its pernicious fruit, but the tree is planted. And as certainly as the branches and the fruit are all in the natural stock that is planted, and it is only a question of time when they will appear, so certainly the widespreading branches and the pernicious fruit of the full-grown tree are in the evil stock of Church and State that has now been planted by the Supreme Court, in and for the Government of the United States; and it is only a question of time when these fruits will inevitably appear. UCS 35.2